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Abstract. Over the past decade, the number of countries reporting falsified (fake, spurious/falsely labeled/counterfeit)
medicines and the types and quantities of fraudulent drugs being distributed have increased greatly. The obstacles in com-
bating falsified pharmaceuticals include 1) lack of consensus on definitions, 2) paucity of reliable and scalable technology to
detect fakes before they reach patients, 3) poor global and national leadership and accountability systems for combating
this scourge, and 4) deficient manufacturing and regulatory challenges, especially in China and India where fake products
often originate. The major needs to improve the quality of the world’s medicines fall into three main areas: 1) research to
develop and compare accurate and affordable tools to identify high-quality drugs at all levels of distribution; 2) an
international convention and national legislation to facilitate production and utilization of high-quality drugs and protect
all countries from the criminal and the negligent who make, distribute, and sell life-threatening products; and 3) a highly
qualified, well-supported international science and public health organization that will establish standards, drug-quality
surveillance, and training programs like the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Such leadership would give authoritative
guidance for countries in cooperation with national medical regulatory agencies, pharmaceutical companies, and interna-
tional agencies, all of which have an urgent interest and investment in ensuring that patients throughout the world have
access to good quality medicines. The organization would also advocate strongly for including targets for achieving good
quality medicines in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals.
THE PROBLEM
Malaria is a devastating illness, particularly to young chil-
dren and pregnant women in tropical countries. A recent
review reported that the active pharmaceutical ingredient
(API) was absent in over one-third of close to 4,000 antima-
larial drug samples tested from pharmacies in seven southeast
Asian and 21 sub-Saharan African countries1; over 40% of the
alleged artemisinin-containing drugs were falsified, outright
fakes. A wide variety of falsified brand name and generic
medicines and even falsified raw ingredients for several essen-
tial pharmaceuticals have been found in rich and poor coun-
tries.2–7 Such drugs are often used for acutely ill patients,
many of whom would die or suffer prolonged illness without
proper treatment. In addition to patients’ loss of confidence in
the health-care delivery system, microbial resistance to the drug
may develop and spread if medicines contain subtherapeutic
doses or no API. The increasing global scientific and public
awareness and epidemic proportions of the spreading prob-
lem are reflected in the number of articles on “fake drugs”
cited in PubMed: 27 papers from 1966 to 1999, 56 papers from
2000 to 2004, 122 papers from 2005 to 2009, and 294 papers
from 2010 to 2015 (February).
Until recently, there were a paucity of reports from pharma-
ceutical companies on the type and quantity of drugs that were
fraudulently compounded or transferred by criminals. Data
are emerging from the Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI),
a not-for-profit membership organization of pharmaceutical
security directors, indicating that a large number of companies,
products, and countries are targeted.8 For instance, since 2008,
Pfizer Pharmaceuticals (Pfizer Global Security, New York,
NY) has identified a rapidly increasing number of falsified
products, countries reporting falsified drugs, and breaches of
the legitimate supply chain national entry points (Table 1); the
increases have been from 40% to over 100%. Of Pfizer prod-
ucts, those for erectile dysfunction are most frequently falsi-
fied9; other such products target patients with Alzheimer’s
disease, cancer, high cholesterol, hypertension, malaria, and
anxiety disorder. Facilities where fake drugs were made or
compounded were discovered with moldy walls, dirty equip-
ment, and infested with rodents and insects (Figure 1). Falsi-
fiers have created products that are visually indistinguishable
from the genuine product, clearly demonstrating criminal intent
to deceive. This increasingly recognized problem on virtually
all continents is a pandemic defined as “an epidemic occurring
over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries, and
usually affecting a large number of people.”10
DEFINITIONS
Despite increasing awareness of the fraudulent drug epi-
demic, efforts to quantify and stop this peril have been stymied
by multiple obstacles, not the least of which is agreement on
definitions.4,11,12 Poor quality drugs include substandard/
spurious/falsely labeled/falsified/counterfeit (SSFFC) medical
products.4 Falsified (also commonly called fake or counterfeit
products are intentionally and fraudulently produced and con-
tain no API, the incorrect dose of the API, or the incorrect
API. Substandard medicines are caused by unintentional or
negligent errors of manufacturing or by degradation after
manufacturing resulting in insufficient API, poor dissolution
properties, or degradation products. The nomenclature used
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by the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Trade
Organization, the United Nations (U.N.) Office on Drugs
and Crime, INTERPOL, and others can be confusing; hence,
we are using terms agreed upon by WHO.4
There are also properly manufactured medicines that are
unlawful for reasons apart from their quality. These can be
unregistered with company branded or generic medicines that,
for reasons of theft or accidental or intentional diversion, do
not have the legally required marketing authorization of the
country’s regulators to be imported or sold there, and medi-
cines that infringe the trademark of a legal product. Relatively
little is known about medicines that have expired and are
repackaged with a new date; these topics along with diverted
products are beyond the realm of this article. This article
focuses mainly on medical and public health considerations of
falsified medicines that are particularly widespread in low- and
middle-income countries.13–15 Although there are increasing
reports of detection of a variety of fake drugs from around
the world, paradoxically, there are virtually no reports from
middle- or high-income countries quantifying the state of poor
quality medicines, only anecdotal case citations.
OVERVIEW OF CONTROL CHALLENGES
Governments have been hampered by a confusing array of
expensive detection technologies. Few functional national
regulatory authorities exist in low-income nations that lack
trained staff and suitably equipped laboratories to test drug
quality centrally or in peripheral pharmacies or markets.13,14
Furthermore, the variability or absence of national and inter-
national criminal statutes, lack of an international agreement
against trafficking of poor quality medicines, and inadequate
punishments for convicted offenders reflect the weak legal
framework for confronting drug fraud. One of the biggest
obstacles in provision of quality-assured pharmaceuticals is
the lack of effective manufacturing, regulatory, and quality
processing in India and China. In 2013, 10 global public health
agencies including providers, foundations, and research insti-
tutions contributed to developing an advocacy campaign to
address falsified medicines, particularly in China. This cam-
paign called Fight the Fakes is a step toward raising awareness
about the problem, but legal action has to follow along with
more public and political awareness.15
The U.S. Institute of Medicine (IOM) has published a
report “Countering the Problem of Falsified and Substandard
Drugs.”16 The IOM recommendations to “stem the global
trade” in such products are laudable in advising that the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Institute
of Standards and Technology, and other U.S. and interna-
tional pharmaceutical and financing agencies be more actively
involved in setting standards and financing improvements; yet
this report falls far short of making a strong call for stan-
dardized, agreed-upon quality assessment technologies; an
international law convention; and a more activist, internation-
ally recognized lead organization, all three of which are essen-
tial for stopping the many health threats of fake drugs. Global
leadership to date has devolved in parts to the WHO, the
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, and INTERPOL, each with
diverse missions, responsibilities, limited authorities, and
their own collaborations, funding networks, cultures, and
languages.17 No organization is leading assertively. Of the
three areas listed, an international convention and improved
national regulations are likely to have the most enduring
value in concert with effective leadership and other innova-
tions. The focus of all actions tied to drug quality must be on
public and individual health, and strengthening national
capacities to improve the health of their citizens.
POLICY PROPOSALS
Detection methods and technology. A major hindrance to
understanding the types, names, extent, and amount of poor
quality drugs nationally and globally has been 1) the lack of
agreed-upon field survey approaches18 and 2) available low-
cost tools to detect and classify bad drugs quickly at points
of entry into countries, at public and private pharmacies, and
in health units. In 2014, theWHO published draft guidelines for
surveys of medicine quality that are currently being revised.19
Two or more levels of drug quality tests exist: 1) methods
useable in the field that are quick, inexpensive, and easy to
use and teach; these methods are targeted mainly to examine
packaging and detect drug contents and 2) technologies
requiring a laboratory equipped for exhaustive chemical anal-
ysis. These approaches are summarized in Table 2, deriving
from the IOM report16 and a recent analysis by Green and
others20 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
reference laboratory. Within each method there are numerous
tools and prototypes being used and new ones tested. Current
technologies for field use rely on visual packaging inspection,
lot number reporting via mobile phones, thin-layer chromatog-
raphy, colorimetric tests, and simplified spectroscopic methods.
Gas and liquid chromatography and mass spectrometry are
some of the more advanced and complex techniques for inves-
tigating drug quality in central laboratories. Qualitative or
semiquantitative tests for an API are not substitutes for proper
manufacturing control, dissolution studies, pharmacokinetics
equivalence, and supply chain integrity. A very promising recent
development has been the U.S. Pharmacopeia Promoting the
Table 1
Falsified drugs and drugs entering the supply chain illegitimately
2008 2014
Countries reporting falsified drugs 75 107
Falsified products 29 69
Breaches of legitimate supply chain entry
Medicines 8 26
Countries 25 60
Countries and products reported by Pfizer global security.
Figure 1. Facility producing fraudulent drugs. Reprinted with the
permission of Pfizer Global Security.
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Quality of Medicines (PQM) program in several African,
Asian, and Latin American countries using the “Minilab”
(Global Pharma Health Fund e.V., Giessen, Germany).21–23
This training program supported by the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) and the President’s Malaria
Initiative (PMI) has trained several hundred persons in rapid
chemical analysis of drugs taken from public and private phar-
macy stocks.23 A major reference training center has recently
been opened in Accra, Ghana, with USAID and U.S. Phar-
macopeia support as a referral testing and regional training
center. Important also is the development of the counterfeit
detection (CD)-3 (US Food and Drug Administration, Forensic
Chemistry Center, Cincinnati, OH), a promising handheld elec-
tronic device for peripheral use that detects fake packaging at
point of sale with images and videos of the suspect samples.24,25
The FDA, Skoll Foundation, and other partners are supporting
expansion of testing and use of this device. We recommend that
a precertification of essential diagnostics, drugs, and vaccines
should be required for specific regional and global control, elim-
ination, and eradication programs and campaigns. More infor-
mation is needed to confirm that precertification of products
is occurring for the PMI and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis andMalaria, and products purchased byU.N. Inter-
national Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and WHO.
Essential drugs designated by WHO should also be targeted
for special vigilance by quality assurance mechanisms.
No independent agency has inventoried and performed com-
parative quality assessments of these packaging and drug-testing
devices and made recommendations to countries for their use.
Objective comparisons are needed of the diversity of field
methods in terms of accuracy, reliability, costs of equipment
and supplies, level of training needed, ease of use, spare part
availability, and maintenance requirements. Simplified standard
survey protocols and methods for sampling drugs at country
entry points (seaports, airports, and roads); at major pharmacy
depots; in health units (public and private hospitals and clinics);
and at more peripheral distribution sites (district and village
pharmacies and individual vendors) are also needed.19 Low-cost,
portable detection tools would empower pharmaceutical inspec-
tors in numerous countries that have oversight of the medicine
supply. Results would be available promptly rather than delayed
when samples are sent to national or international laboratories
as occurs now; lamentably, intervals of several years have
occurred from the time specimens were collected to the time
the results were available to those needing to take action.1
Ideally, central reference laboratories vetted by WHO, FDA,
or another agency would back up spot checks and random
sampling of pharmaceuticals at the periphery.
Good quality medicines by law. Falsified medicines are
ultimately a problem that impacts public health. The solution
needs to reflect various incentives, either via financial gain,
avoidance of punishment or both. A multi-sectorial effort is
essential for taking into account how this illegal market is
interwoven with world trade agreements, business models,
and associated legal ramifications. Globalization has enlarged
the international trade in medicines. For example, India exports
over US$15.5 billion in pharmaceuticals, which are among their
most important exports.26 As of 2011, 40% of drugs and 80% of
APIs for drugs in the United States are imported from foreign
countries.27 An international law convention against substan-
dard and falsified medicines would address both regulatory and
criminal international governance challenges simultaneously
through technical, legal, and financial mechanisms.
How would the convention work and what national benefits
would it bring?A convention would provide four legal under-
pinnings that do not exist, that together would advance patient
safety and access to quality medicines.12 First, a convention
would define the various sorts of wrongful medicines accu-
rately and thereby avoid misunderstandings caused by today’s
problematic or vague terminology (e.g., where countries seized
good quality generic medicines as “counterfeit”). Second, a
convention would promote the requirement that signatory
countries enact national laws to designate wrongful acts—
such as the intentional manufacture, trafficking, or selling of
Table 2
Technologies for testing poor quality medicines
Tests useable in field Detects
Visual inspection of package and product Wrong package, color, size, shape, and spelling
Alternative light sources Wrong color of ink, holograms, packaging, excipients in pills (wavelengths in the
visible (350–700 nm) and nonvisible (> 700 nm) electromagnetic spectrum
Colorimetry Wrong kind and/or amounts of API
Simplified disintegration tests Disintegration, as marker for bioavailability
“Minilab” Compendium of thin-layer chromatography and simplified disintegration tests
Raman spectroscopy (portable, dispersive) Active ingredients identity by radiation scattering and database matching
NIR spectroscopy (portable, dispersive) Active ingredients identity by radiation reflection/absorption and database matching
Tests requiring central laboratory Detects
GC Quantify volatile organic residual solvents, link to manufacturer
HPLC Quantify known active ingredients and impurities
NMR spectroscopy Identify and verify identity of active ingredients, excipients; enhanced structural information
Raman spectroscopy (Fourier transform) Identify active ingredients, excipients; relative concentrations, coating composition,
spatially-resolved information through microscopy
Dissolution tests Index of bioavailability
Ambient (direct) MS Screen identity and semiquantitation of active ingredients, excipients, analogs, undeclared
compounds, impurities
GC–MS Confirm identity of volatile ingredients and residual solvents, contaminants, undeclared
compounds, and impurities with higher selectivity
LC–MS and tandem MS/MS Quantify active ingredients, excipients; identify wrong active ingredients with
higher selectivity
API = active pharmaceutical ingredient; GC = gas chromatography; HPLC = high-performance liquid chromatography; LC = liquid chromatography; MS = mass spectrometry; NIR = near
infrared; NMR = nuclear magnetic resonance.
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falsified medicines—as criminal offences, with attendant obli-
gations to alert health-care workers and to prosecute or extra-
dite the offenders to justice promptly. Third, a convention
would provide the legal and institutional framework for partic-
ipating countries to agree, implement, and evolve convergent
standards of medicine regulation, so as to reduce poor quality
medicines in international trade. Fourth, and for lower income
countries particularly, a convention would contain mechanisms
for financial and technical assistance, and, to join local and
regional networks. These actions would help build national
and regional medicine regulatory authorities (MRAs) to a
point where patients’ access to quality medicines is protected.
Some have said that establishing recommended codes of
practice that are nonbinding (soft law) are better than inter-
national norms and regulations that are binding (hard law).28
We disagree with soft law in regard to controlling the current
fake-drug pandemic. There are precedents for using inter-
national law in this way. A 1929 treaty that internationally
criminalizes counterfeit banknotes provides an analogy for
falsified medicines. In the health field, there are treaties spe-
cifically addressing the illicit traffic of certain narcotic drugs
and treaties to prevent harm—particularly, the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control and its associated proto-
cols to stanch illicit trade. That convention has brought
over US$250 million new funding to global tobacco-control
efforts, demonstrating that international law need not com-
pete for resources, but can increase them.29 The U.N. Office
on Drugs and Crime has been developing “Draft Model
Legislative Provisions on Fraudulent Medical Products” for
several years but there has been no agreement on final text;
the focus appears to be on criminal and judicial issues.
Challenges ahead. Information is accruing that large quan-
tities of falsified drugs are being manufactured in Asian coun-
tries. China and India are two of the largest producers of good
quality drugs and vaccines, many of which are purchased or
funded by the USAID; UNICEF; Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria; WHO; and other organizations,
charities, and national agencies for global disease control and
eradication programs. However, according to the World Cus-
toms Organization, in 2006, 54% and 21% of unlawful drugs
of all sorts confiscated worldwide were manufactured in India
and China, respectively.30 The circuitous travel itineraries of
fake medicines have been traced across continents, such that
the unsuspecting recipient countries assume a bona fide origin.
A particularly heinous example is that of multiples instances
of the production, marketing, and international travel of falsi-
fied bevacizumab (AvastinÒ), a cancer medicine; the fake drug
closely matched the appearance of the real medicine, but tests
indicated salt, starch, and various cleaning solvents instead of
the active ingredient with resulting endophthalmitis.31
The Internet has opened up an unregulated opportunity for
criminals to promote and sell fake drugs to unsuspecting vul-
nerable populations, often the aged and others seeking con-
venience and low cost. A recent survey of over 10,000 online
pharmacies found that 96% operated outside legal regulations
and a large percentage closed operations within 3 years of oper-
ation.32,33 The FDA and other organizations participate with
INTERPOL in annual international actions (Operation Pangea)
to shutdown illegal pharmacy websites selling potentially coun-
terfeit and illegal medical products. More than 18,000 such
illegal websites were closed during one week in 2012 with sei-
zure of US$10.5 million of pharmaceuticals worldwide.34
Leadership, collaboration, and national strengthening.
Arguably, the major obstacle to solving the problem of poor
quality medicines has been the lack of a clearly identified
lead organization with a plan of action developed in concert
with countries, pharmaceutical companies (multinational cor-
porations and innovator/biotechnology enterprises), and national
and international agencies—and a sense of urgency to implement
the plan with resources and partners—including pharmaceuti-
cal companies in low-income countries. WHO has estimated
that 30% of countries have inadequate medicines regulation
authorities (MRAs) or none at all. Moreover, WHO has
found that 90% of African MRAs lack the capacity to under-
take medicine regulatory functions and therefore cannot guar-
antee the quality, efficacy, and safety of medicines,35,36 The
New Partnership for Africa’s Development has found that
there is either limited or declining government funding for
MRAs in the East African Community Partner States.37
Many have looked to WHO for this leadership, given its
successful implementation of the public health treaty on
tobacco control. However, some argue that the U.N. system,
including the WHO, is poorly suited to be in a leadership role
because of sparse technical expertise in products, manufactur-
ing, and quality systems. U.N. agencies are beholden to member
states and cannot regulate or enforce anything easily, espe-
cially, in India and China. In this regard, WHO could serve
the role of a partner rather than a leader. The recently revi-
talized Rapid Alert program at WHO has begun to “track and
trace” poor quality drugs as reported voluntarily by member
countries.38 Rapid Alert notices are published periodically
by WHO indicating the fake drug type, lot number, quantity
of product, and place detected. Strong action by countries can
stem the tide as shown in Rwanda39 and Cambodia,40 although
unique situations and major multi-sectorial engagements exist
in these countries. One solution is creation of regional har-
monization networks, addressing some elements of drug reg-
istration tied to regional economic communities; the African
Medicines Registration Harmonization Initiative is one exam-
ple of such a network. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) has also made recent attempts at facilitating inter-
national cooperation against falsified medicines. One pro-
posal has been a trilateral coalition of the UNODC, WHO,
and Interpol.17 Still, active and transparent support from
the FDA, drug companies, individual countries, and other
partners will be needed; the FDA may be the most qualified
as a leadership organization based on their technical exper-
tise and global influence. Mechanisms for training technical
staff, regulating products, improving manufacturing prac-
tices, and stopping criminal production are needed to assure
a good supply of medicines. Given that the problem of sub-
standard and falsified medicines should be approached pri-
marily from a public health and equity perspective, it is
important that the negotiations on the way forward be led by
the Ministries of Health along with the Ministers of Finance
and Trade, while respecting legitimate intellectual property
rights. Could and should WHO be the lead organization in
curbing the spreading epidemic of falsified pharmaceuticals?
WHO’s ability to take more assertive action is strengthened
by the revised international health regulations. WHO’s direc-
tor general can convene emergency committees in response to
public health emergencies as has been done recently for the
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009, the middle east respi-
ratory syndrome (MERS-CoV) in 2013, the polio crises in
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2014, and the Ebola epidemic in 2014–2015. Illicit drug traf-
ficking is an emergency. The Drug Quality and Security Act,
signed into law by President Obama in 2013, outlines steps to
build an electronic system to identify and trace certain pre-
scription drugs in the United States. The results of this system
are awaited.
Finally, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
under revision, should include measurable objectives for good
quality drugs. This will encourage national establishment of
baseline status and achievable targets, particularly for essen-
tial drugs. Establishment of MDG targets and Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) will help greatly to solve the
poor quality drug epidemic by application of available tech-
nology and good pharmaceutical vigilance and governance.41
One incentive that would transform the current system is
applying a “universal quality standard” to drug products. For
example, if India allows a substandard manufacturer to sell
products in Africa, the FDA could ban import of products
from India. Although difficult to develop and implement, a
combination of incentives and penalties driven at the political
and economic levels is needed.
CONCLUSIONS
The major urgent needs to improve the quality of the world’s
medicines fall into three main areas: 1) research to develop
and compare the most accurate and affordable tools to iden-
tify high-quality drugs at point of sale and deployment of the
best methods; 2) an international convention and national
legislation to facilitate production and use of high-quality
drugs and protect all countries from the criminal and the
negligent who make, distribute, and sell life-threatening prod-
ucts; 3) designation of a highly qualified, well-supported inter-
national organization, possibly the FDA or WHO, that will
establish standards, training programs, drug quality surveil-
lance, and authoritative guidance for countries in cooperation
with national medical regulatory agencies, pharmaceutical
companies, and international agencies, all of which have an
urgent interest and investment in ensuring that patients
throughout the world have access to good quality medicines.
The organization would also advocate strongly for including
targets for achieving good quality medicines in the MDGs and
SDGs including certification of pharmaceutical products
entering countries that request such services, and participate
in global disease control and elimination programs.
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